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Human moral judgement may have evolved to maximize the individual’s wel-
fare given parochial culturally constructed moral systems. If so, then moral
condemnation should be more severe when transgressions are recent and
local, and should be sensitive to the pronouncements of authority figures
(who are often arbiters of moral norms), as the fitness pay-offs of moral disap-
proval will primarily derive from the ramifications of condemning actions that
occurwithin the immediate social arena. Correspondingly,moral transgressions
should be viewed as less objectionable if they occur in other places or times, or if
local authorities deem them acceptable. These predictions contrast markedly
with those derived fromprevailingnon-evolutionary perspectives onmoral jud-
gement. Both classes of theories predict purportedly species-typical patterns, yet
to our knowledge, no study to date has investigated moral judgement across
a diverse set of societies, including a range of small-scale communities
that differ substantially from large highly urbanized nations. We tested these
predictions in five small-scale societies and two large-scale societies, finding
substantial evidence of moral parochialism and contextual contingency in
adults’ moral judgements. Results reveal an overarching pattern in which
moral condemnation reflects a concern with immediate local considerations, a
pattern consistent with a variety of evolutionary accounts of moral judgement.1. Introduction
The propensity to pass sentiment-laden moral judgement on others’ actions
appears to be a human universal [1]. Negative judgements potentially entail
non-trivial costs, as, above and beyond issues of the allocation of time and atten-
tion, morally condemning another can bring the actor into conflict with criticized
individuals or their allies. Ceteris paribus, individualswho cared little about third
parties’ actions that did not affect themwould have higher fitness than thosewho
embroiled themselves in others’ affairs throughmoral condemnation. At the same
time, moral condemnation and attendant moralistic action generate a collective
good, as these can play a central role in enhancing cooperation and deterring
exploitative behaviour that corrodes the welfare of the group [2]. From the
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central place in efforts to understand both the history of our
species and the evolution of cooperation [3].
Though differing in their particulars, a variety of theories
indicate that morality is plausibly understood as the product
of the conjunction of cultural evolution, which produces
norms regulating behaviour, and genetic evolution, which
produced psychological mechanisms that increase individual
fitness within local culturally constructed social arenas [4–6].
Importantly, despite their differences, all of these evolutionary
theories thus predict that third-party moral evaluations will
generally be parochial: if moral disapproval ultimately serves
to enhance one’s reputation in a manner that: (i) deters trans-
gressions against the self, (ii) increases opportunities to
participate inmutually beneficial cooperation, and (iii) protects
one from higher order punishment [7–11], then, because these
benefits will only accrue in the immediate social arena, moral
judgements should primarily address recent or ongoing
events in one’s own social group (the primary exception
being the use of moral judgement to elevate the in-group and
denigrate an out-group when rival groups conflict—[12]).
With the exception of situations of intergroup conflict—
including contexts in which offences against one’s group
are committed by another group—events that have occurred
at a distant place or time will generally have fewer impli-
cations for members of one’s own group than events that
have occurred nearby and recently. As a result, people can
be expected to attend less to moral proclamations regarding
spatially or temporally distant incidents. Indeed, to the
extent that an immediate audience does not have a stake in
defending remote targets of disapproval, and such targets
will neither learn of the disapproval nor be able to retaliate,
such statements, being readily issued, risk being dismissed
as cheap talk. Paralleling this, because the condemned
actions, being remote, do not disrupt cooperation or coordi-
nation within the local social arena, repeatedly voicing such
statements may lead others to attend less to the proclaimer’s
judgements (the problem of ‘crying wolf’ in the moral judge-
ment arena), thereby reducing the individual’s ability to
amass reputational capital. Relatedly, because an audience’s
attention is a finite resource, moral condemnation will
entail opportunity costs whenever making such pronounce-
ments comes at the expense of other forms of social action.
Hence, moral proclamations regarding remote events hold
fewer strategic affordances for those who would make
them. At the psychological level, when heartfelt, moral con-
demnation reflects the experience of punitive sentiments
that can motivate taking more extensive action against the
offender [7], actions that can have great strategic importance
for the punisher. Because it is difficult or impossible to take
action against remote offenders, there is little value in
strongly activating punitive sentiments. Taken together, the
above considerations indicate that we can expect natural
selection to have refined the input criteria for moral condem-
nation and the sentiments that underlie and attend it such
that remote events will not activate the evolved mechanisms
undergirding negative moral evaluation to the same degree
as actions that occur in the here and now. This is not to say
that actors should assess remote transgressions as acceptable.
Rather, remote events should simply trouble actors less than
immediate events, evoking weaker sentiments and eliciting
less overt condemnation. (The mechanisms at issue afford
such muted responses because, to function properly in thelocal arena, they must produce graded rather than binary
outputs as, if punishment is to be administered efficiently,
the strength of condemnation must correspond with the
seriousness of the transgression.)
Paralleling the above considerations, because local stan-
dards change over time, and their application is frequently
subject to interpretation, if actors are to accrue individual
benefits by passing moral judgement on others’ actions,
they must be sensitive to indices of current local opinion—
moral condemnation can only enhance opportunities for
inclusion in cooperative ventures and reduce the likelihood
of higher order punishment if the condemner’s evaluative cri-
teria match those of her audience. Because authority figures
and other high-status individuals are often the arbiters of
local norms, people can thus be expected to attend to their
pronouncements regarding the moral status of particular
actions, as such statements will frequently be determinative
of how the community will view these actions. Additionally,
the effect of authority figures’ opinions on individuals’ views
will be bolstered by the fact that adamantly adhering to a
stance at odds with that of local authorities will often carry
real costs. Although formal offices empowering authorities
probably first became widespread during the Neolithic Revo-
lution, acephalous hunter–gatherer bands exhibit inequalities
in prestige [13], hence we can expect selection to have long
shaped the mechanisms responsible for adjusting moral con-
demnation in light of the opinions of influential individuals.
The above evolutionary perspective diverges sharply from
a prominent approach in moral psychology. A voluminous
and influential literature, pioneered by Turiel [14], argues
that moral rules—putatively rules that address questions of
harm, rights or justice—are viewed by adults as inherently
both applying to all peoples at all times and being indepen-
dent of the pronouncements of authority figures. Indeed,
such invariance is hypothesized to be a hallmark of moral
rules, in contrast to conventions, which are ostensibly recog-
nized by adults as being contingent on local practices and
subject to change. This is one version of what we term the
theory of universalistic moral evaluation, which holds that
the nature of the processes underlying moral assessment are
such that, all else being equal, actions that are judged to be
immoral are thought to be wrong independent of the time or
place in which they occur, and regardless of the opinions of
influential or powerful individuals.
Both the evolutionary perspective outlined above and
theories of universalistic moral evaluation hold that their
respectively predicted features of moral assessment are pan-
human. Accordingly, a crucial test for both approaches is a
stringent cross-cultural investigation that examines patterns
of moral assessment across a diverse range of human
societies. Although work on moral judgement has long
been conducted cross-culturally (reviewed in [15]), such
investigations generally examine members of large-scale
societies. While differing from Westerners in many ways,
individuals in non-Western large-scale societies are neverthe-
less likely to be more similar to Westerners with regard to
potentially relevant dimensions, such as education and fam-
iliarity with formal legal systems, than are members of many
small-scale societies [16]. This is further complicated by the
fact that much work to date has focused on children’s
moral development, leaving the key question of panhuman
features of adult moral judgements underexplored. To pro-
vide a more definitive test of the competing predictions
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ment, we therefore examined adults’ judgements in both
large-scale societies and a diverse range of small-scale
societies—societies with low population densities where
traditional ways of life remain important and which have
been influenced to a limited degree by large-scale societies.
Critics of the theory of universalistic moral evaluation
have claimed that a significant proportion of adults in the
West judge transgressions involving harm, rights or justice
to be more acceptable if they occurred long ago or far
away, or if the actions were endorsed by authorities. Initial
reports in this regard [17] led to debate and further investi-
gations, producing heterogeneous results and no consensus
[18–25]. For several reasons, tests to date are inconclusive.
First, and most importantly, comparisons across truly dissim-
ilar societies are critically absent. Second, the evolutionary
views predict that, because moral disapproval in response
to transgressions is shaped by both spatial/temporal distance
and the pronouncements of authorities, moral condemnation
occupies a graded continuum, contingent on the particulars
of each case. However, consonant with the historical focus
on children, previous investigations have generally employed
simple dichotomous judgements regarding the acceptability
of actions, obscuring any such continuum.
Independent of the above debate, several bodies of proxi-
mate-level research potentially bear on the predictions at issue.
First, in what has been termed the Black Sheep Effect [26,27],
both positive and negative social assessments have been
shown to be more extreme when applied to in-group members
than when applied to out-group members. This bias is conso-
nant with the parochialism predicted by evolutionary theories
ofmorality. The impact of others’ actions on both the individual
and the group will generally be greater when the actors are
members of the in-group, and, correspondingly, the pay-offs
to the observer of engaging in social evaluation, be it positive
ornegative, shouldbemore pronounced in this case [8]; as a con-
sequence, selection can be expected to have shapedmechanisms
underlying social evaluation so as to generate more marked
praise or condemnation of in-group members relative to out-
group members. Consistent with this view, enhanced in-group
extremity in moral evaluations and/or the assignation of pun-
ishment has been found in the majority of relevant studies,
conducted, respectively, with United States, Japanese and
German university students ([8,28,29], but see [30]) and matur-
ing British schoolchildren [31]. While relevant to the question
at hand, such studies clearly suffer the core limitation of an
exclusive focus on large-scale societies.
Whereas research on the Black Sheep Effect and related
topics parallels predictions of moral parochialism, a second
body of work generates the opposite predictions. Construal
Level Theory [32] holds that psychological distance (defined
as spatial, temporal, or social distance, or hypotheticality)
increases the degree of abstractness with which an event is con-
strued. On this view, moral rules are more abstract than
pragmatic considerations, hence more distant events should be
construed in more moral terms; as a consequence, more distant
transgressions should be judged to be more immoral [33,34].
Although experiments with Israeli and Swedish university stu-
dents reveal that actions in the distant future are conceptualized
in moral terms more than are near-term actions [33–35], these
results failed to replicate in a United States university sample
[36] and a Serbian university sample [37]; in another United
States university sample, the relationship between temporaldistance and severity of moral judgement appears to reverse
when events in the past are considered (see [38], Experiment 1).
Despite these mixed results, given the limited research to date,
the predictions of Construal Level Theory, opposite to those of
evolutionary theories of moral parochialism, merit testing.
Here, we put the divergent predictions regarding moral
judgement to a stringent test: we employ adult samples
from five different small-scale societies and two dissimilar
large-scale societies; we replace dichotomous judgements of
the acceptability of actions with graduated judgements; and
we focus on transgressions of important social norms, using
scenarios designed to embody the putative hallmarks of
moral violations [14].2. Material and methods
We selected small-scale societies that differ with regard to factors
central to much cultural variation. Two societies (Tsimane’ and
Shuar) are egalitarian indigenous South American groups whose
economies are based on horticulture, hunting and fishing; one
(Yasawa) is a semi-stratified clan-based indigenous Fijian group
reliant on fishing and horticulture; one (Karo Batak) is a clan-
based rural Indonesian group focusing on rice agriculture, whereas
another (Sursurunga) is a clan-based Melanesian horticulturalist
group. Providing points of contrast, data were also collected in
Storozhnitsa, a village in western Ukraine, and in relatively affluent
urban areas (Santa Monica and San Jose´) in California, USA. (See
the electronic supplementary material for details.)
To test the prediction that judgements of thewrongness of trans-
gressions would be contingent on the temporal and spatial locality
of the acts and the pronouncements of authority figures, we crafted
seven simple vignettes describing clear and substantial harm, viola-
tions of rights and/or injustice: aman stealing a stranger’s money; a
man battering his wife without provocation; a man striking and
injuring a friend after the friend unintentionally injured him; a
man cheating a stranger in a market transaction; a man knowingly
spreading a false rumour that his rival is a thief; the initiator of a
fight bribing a witness to lie about who was at fault, resulting in
the innocent party being punished; and aman raping an unfamiliar
woman (see the electronic supplementary material). For each vign-
ette, after asking the participant to evaluate the given action (‘How
good or bad is what [the protagonist] did?’), we then sequentially
asked the participant to provide such an evaluation in the event
that: (i) a locally appropriate authority figure stated that the action
was ‘not bad’; (ii) the action occurred in the distant past; and
(iii) the action occurred far away, in another society. Note that,
while we anticipated some cross-societal variation in regard to the
permissibility of some of these actions, our objective was to test
whether those actions viewed in a given society as unequivocally
badwouldbe judged less bad in light of (i), (ii) and (iii), asmoralpar-
ochialism predicts, or would not be so judged, as both moral
universalism and Construal Level Theory predict.
In total, 237 adults across the seven research sites participated
(see table 1 for sample characteristics). Vignettes were read aloud
in the local language in one of two counterbalanced orders (see
the electronic supplementary material). To ensure comprehen-
sion, participants were quizzed on each scenario following its
presentation; if answers were incorrect, vignettes were re-read,
and the process was repeated. Consonant with the simplicity of
the vignettes, 96.4% of participants passed the comprehension
test at first presentation, with the remainder passing sub-
sequently. Participants were then asked to evaluate each act on
a five-point scale (from ‘Extremely Bad’ to ‘Extremely Good’).
A printed linear scale (see the electronic supplementary material)
was displayed and explained to participants, who pointed to the
anchor marks that corresponded with their assessments. To
Table 1. Sample characteristics.
site N
sex ratio age (in years)
% female M s.d.
Tsimane’ 30 53.3 37.8 14.39
Shuar 32 62.5 25.9 9.24
Yasawa 49 46.9 41.8 14.77
Karo Batak 34 61.8 35.8 15.75
Sursurunga 30 36.7 43.6 13.75
Storozhnitsa 30 73.3 47.3 15.35
California 32 40.6 28.0 10.04
authority consent temporal distance spatial distance
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Figure 1. Reductions in the ranked ‘badness’ of transgressions, aggregated across scenarios, as a function of the consent of an authority figure, temporal distance, or
spatial distance, presented as odds ratios and their 97.5% confidence intervals. The odds ratios, computed by exponentiating the beta coefficients (eb), provide the
odds of a badness judgement falling at a given ranked level or below when the factor is present, relative to when it is absent, across all badness levels. Odds ratios
above 1 thus indicate reduced judgements of badness.
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addressing moral concerns (rather than, for example, unfortunate
consequences), the same scale was next used to evaluate the
effect that the act would have on the protagonist’s reputation
as a good or bad person. The severity of the transgression was
then evaluated in three different contexts, presented in fixed
order: authority consent, temporal distance and spatial distance
(see the electronic supplementary material).3. Results
Prior to conducting ourprincipal analyses, as an internal validity
check,we comparedparticipants’ initial ratings of the badness of
the seven transgressions with their ratings of the reputational
costs suffered by the protagonist (see the electronic supplemen-
tary material). Significant positive correlations in all samples
indicated that the former indeed reflect moral considerations.
To determine whether participants’ judgements of the
wrongness of the actions described in the scenarioswere affected
by the temporal or spatial locality of the acts or the pronounce-
ments of authority figures, we conducted a series of ordinal
regressions on participants’ judgements, using temporal dis-
tance, spatial distance and authority consent as factors (we
refer to these variables as TEMPORAL, SPATIAL and AUTH-
ORITY, respectively). For these analyses, we examined only
cases in which participants rated the act as ‘bad’ or ‘extremely
bad’, as our hypothesis pertains only to judgements of acts
judged as immoral [18]. The initial rating of the harmful act
thus doubles as a manipulation check to ensure that theparticipant considered the given act wrong. The vast majority
of participants (95.2%, averaged across vignettes) rated acts as
‘bad’ or ‘extremely bad’, and no participant rated more than
one act as acceptable, so no participant was excluded from
the final aggregate sample (see the electronic supplementary
material, table S2, for final sample sizes for each scenario).
Using the ordinal package in R [39], we fit a series of cumulat-
ive link mixed models (also known as ordered logit models) to
the data, using model comparison to select the best-fit of each
of the models. The resulting model reveals which of our study
variables significantly impacted participants’ moral judgements
independent of age, sex, education, society and type of scenario
evaluated (see the electronic supplementary material for
complete analyses and results).
If the capacity for moral assessment evolved to operate in
variable culturally constructed moral arenas, then such
judgements should exhibit lessercondemnationof transgressions
removed in time or space, or when the act is condoned by local
arbiters of norms. Consistent with this prediction, our best-fit
model revealed that the factors TEMPORAL, SPATIAL and
AUTHORITY all produced substantial variation in the strength
of participants’ judgements of the moral wrongness of acts,
with an increase in each factor leading to a reduction in wrong-
ness judgements (figure 1; see the electronic supplementary
material for details). Participants in all seven societies viewed
actions involving gross infliction of harm, violation of rights,
and/or injustice as less immoral when they occurred long ago,
and the same is truewith regard to spatial distance. Endorsement
by an authority has this effect in four of the societies sampled,
with the other three societies displaying non-significant trends
in the direction of reduced severity. These results are robust to
differences in sample composition with respect to age, sex and
education. Moreover, the patterns emerge despite substantial
differences between the samples in the contributions made by
the various scenarios. For example, in the Shuar and Storozhnitsa
samples, cheating a stranger in themarketplacewas a scenario in
which judgements were least influenced by spatial or temporal
distance or authority consent, whereas the opposite was true in
the Yasawa, Tsimane’ and California samples (see the electronic
supplementary material for details).4. Discussion
Consistent with the thesis that moral judgements reflect
mechanisms that evolved to maximize the benefits derived
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social arena, across seven very different societies we find evi-
dence that moral judgements of some self-evidently harmful
or unjust behaviours are notably parochial and contingent on
context. Although participants from the various societies
differ in their opinion as to whether a given transgression’s
wrongness is reduced by spatial or temporal distance or the
opinions of authorities, for each society sampled, the over-
arching pattern across transgressions is clear: there is no
evidence of a robust insistence that moral rules are judged
to apply equally strongly across such contexts. These results
pose a powerful challenge to prevailing views in moral psy-
chology that are committed to the theory of universalistic
moral evaluation.
While moral parochialism was evident in each of the
societies sampled, nowhere was it absolute—evaluating
transgressions that occurred long ago, far away, or were
approved of by authority figures generally led participants
to view the acts as less bad, but not as perfectly acceptable.
A number of possible explanations address this pattern.
First, immediate events in the in-group may be the proper
domain of biologically evolved mechanisms undergirding
moral judgement, such that condemnation of remote events
may simply be a partially elicited by-product. Relatedly,
because social interconnectedness is a matter of degree, eva-
luative mechanisms may produce graded judgements in
parallel with personal relevance; weak condemnation of
remote events may simply reflect the distal end of this conti-
nuum. Alternately, while operating at a reduced intensity,
biologically evolved mechanisms undergirding moral judge-
ment may apply current local standards to other contexts in
order to afford evaluation of out-group members as possible
interaction partners and/or maintain the ability to evaluate
authority figures’ competence. Finally, culturally evolved
moral rules prescribing universal applicability may have
emerged in the last two millennia in conjunction with tech-
nologies allowing for unprecedented travel, communication
and conquest, as such rules may leverage these technologies
in the service of rapid group expansion.
Everyday conversations suggest that, in many of the
societies we sampled, people appear to endorse the universal
applicability of moral rules. That our participants’ responses
nonetheless reveal moral parochialism is consistent with a var-
iety of dual-process psychological models, wherein moral
judgements do not result exclusively—perhaps not even pri-
marily—from deliberative moral reasoning, instead being at
least partly the product of calculations that occur outside of
conscious awareness. Specifically, our results are congruent
with dual-process models that stress the importance of
emotion [40–42]: given that, in many domains, adaptations
shape behaviour through affective influences on motivation
and cognition [43,44], such accounts mesh well with our
thesis that moral parochialism reflects the central role that
dedicated evolved mechanisms play in moral judgement.
The observed reductions in our participants’ judgements
of the wrongness of acts as a function of spatial or temporal
distance are unlikely to merely reflect differences in their
interpretation of the questions posed to them. When asked
to judge the act in the initial presentation (the present time;
a location not far from here), participants can reliably be
presumed to be offering their own assessment of the act.
However, when asked to judge the act elsewhere, or in the
past, might participants have interpreted the question asaddressing not their own views, but rather the consensus of
people living at the specified place or time? While we
cannot exclude this possibility, it does not explain the pat-
terned nature of our findings. It is common to romanticize
the past and bemoan present-day moral degeneration
[45,46], yet, like spatial distance, temporal distance decreases
wrongness judgements in all seven samples, suggesting that
perspective-taking probably does not undergird participants’
responses. Moreover, whereas a perspective-taking account
would predict uniformity in the imagined moral sensibilities
of individuals living in remote places or the distant past,
within each sample, the scenarios varied substantially in
the extent to which spatial and temporal distance inspired
reductions in moral condemnation.
The seven societies sampled vary in the degree to which
moral judgements are parochial and contingent on the pro-
nouncements of authorities. At one extreme, Ukrainian
villagers evince strong reductions in judgements of moral
wrongness as a function of temporal distance, spatial distance
and authority consent. At the other extreme, Yasawan villagers
display much smaller changes in judgement, and do so only in
response to temporal and spatial distance. Interestingly,
although Western liberal democracies often rhetorically
espouse universalist moral positions, urban Californians
occupied the middle of the spectrum in this regard. In the
future, it will be important to explore which social, psychologi-
cal or historical factors influence the degree of moral
parochialism exhibited in a given society.
Our study of five small-scale societies and two large-scale
societies revealswidespreadmoral parochialism and contextual
contingency, suggesting that one or more of the contemporary
evolutionary accounts of human morality may well be correct.
If so, then, in addition to being both parochial and responsive
to authority, moral assessments should be conformist, as indi-
viduals frequently prosper by following the views of the
majority [47]. History reveals that, together, dependence on
the pronouncements of authorities and conformism can under-
gird genocide and similar horrors, while moral parochialism
can undergird indifference to their occurrence elsewhere.
Progress in alleviating human suffering may therefore best be
achieved by a fuller understanding of the nature and origins
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